Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2002

This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency
Jeffrey Fagan
Columbia Law School, jfagan@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing
Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1267

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

ARTICLES

THIS WILL HURT ME MORE THAN IT HURTS YOU:

SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY
JEFFREY FAGAN*

In December, 1998, the European Commission of Human
Rights declared Great Britain guilty of three violations of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the trial and sentencing of Robert Thompson and Jon Venables in the murder of the
toddler Jamie Bulger.' The case was notorious in Britain, the
United States, and many other western countries due to the
young age of the defendants (both were ten years of age) and the
extreme cruelty of their act relative to their young age. The
defendants were tried and convicted in a lengthy proceeding in
the adult court. The trial judge and Lord Chief Justice recommended eight and ten-year sentences. 2 The then-British Home
Secretary raised the sentences on the two defendants to fifteen
years, but this decision was quashed by the House of Lords as
procedurally unfair.3
This case opened a contentious debate in Great Britain on
the age threshold of criminal responsibility for young defendants
t Support for this research was provided in part by grants from the MacArthur Foundation Research Program on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Open Society Institute.
Opinions and mistakes are mine alone. Thanks to Nisha Menon and Carrie
Gustafson for excellent research assistance, and to Gillian Metzger for generously sharing her knowledge of statutes.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Professor of Public Health,
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University.
1. V. v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121 (ser. C) at 87-120, 130-45
(2000).
2. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Ex parte Venables, [1997] 1 All
E.R. 327, 343 (H.L. 1997) (appeal taken from Q.B.).
3. Id. at 345. The House of Lords ruled that, in fixing the tariff or minimum period of detention, the Secretary of State had departed from requisite
standards of fairness by not making full disclosure of the material facts, by failing to take into account all relevant considerations, and by taking into account
irrelevant material derived from the media and public petitions. Id. at 328.
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and on the allocation of adult punishment for adolescent offenders.4 However, the Commission chose to address neither of those
concerns. The Commission's opinion narrowly addressed procedural deficiencies involving the trial competence of the very
young defendants and due process concerns in the government's
attempts to lengthen their sentences. The Commission found
that the criminal procedures adopted prevented the boys from
participating effectively in their trial, thereby impairing fact-finding and the allocation of responsibility.5 It upheld by eighteen to
one a further complaint that the way in which the boys'
sentences were altered by the then-Home Secretary Michael
Howard represented a breach of their human rights, as this decision was taken by a politician and not "an independent and
impartial tribunal."6 The Human Rights Commission decided,
again by eighteen to one, that there had been a violation of the
boys' right to a review of the lawfulness of the continuation of
their imprisonment.7
Nevertheless, the Commission's ruling brought the growing
American trend to criminalize juvenile delinquency into the
international forum of human rights. The Commission relied on
specific elements in the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child,' including: the right to privacy at all stages of
judicial proceedings;9 the establishment of a minimum age below
which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to
infringe the penal laws;'" alternatives to (adult) judicial proceed4. See generally BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS (1999); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998); THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000); Christian Pfeiffer, Juvenile Crime and Violence in Europe, 23
CRIME & JUST. 255 (1998); Michael Freeman, The James Bulger Tragedy: Childish
Innocence and the Construction of Guilt, in THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN
255-303 (1997); StephanieJ. Millet, Note, The Age of CriminalResponsibility in an
Era of Violence: Has Great Britain Set a New International Standard? 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 295 (1995);J. Neville Turner, TheJames Bulger Case: A Challenge to
JuvenileJustice Theories, 68 LAW INST. J. 734, 736-37 (1994).
5. See V. v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121 (ser. C) at 130-45, 156.
6. Id. at 128.
7. Id. at 164.
8. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989)
[hereinafter Convention].
9. Id. at art. 40(2) (b) (vii) ("Every child alleged as or accused of having
infringed the penal law has at least the following guarantees... (vii) To have
his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.").
10. Id. at art. 40(3)(a).
States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children
alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal
law, and, in particular: (a) The establishment of a minimum age below
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ings, providing that human rights are fully respected; 1 and fixing the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles at an age level
that takes into account the expected emotional, mental and
intellectual maturity of children. 12 Article 40 of the Convention
harmonizes two principles that have paralyzed U.S. conceptions
of juvenile justice: the need to treat children differendy because
of their age and level of development and the need to accord
children procedural safeguards enjoyed by adults."3
In addition, other Convention provisions address the administration of the criminal justice system as it applies to minors,
prohibiting "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"' 4 obligating signers to provide rehabilitative care, 5 and
declaring that children who have violated (adult) penal laws
should be "treated in a manner consistent with the promotion
[of the] child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the
which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe
the penal law.
Id.
11. Id. at art. 40(3)(b).
States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children
alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal
law, and, in particular: ... (b) Whenever appropriate and desirable,
measures for dealing with such children without resorting to judicial
proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are
fully respected.
Id.
12. Id. at art. 391.
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical
and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of
any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed
conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.
Id.; See also id. at Preamble, which states, "[T] he child, by reason of his physical
and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection."
13. Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Youth, Family and the Law:
Defining Rights and EstablishingRecognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 177, 189 (1996).
14. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 37(a) ("States Parties shall ensure that:
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.").
15. Id. at art. 40(4).
A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision
orders; counseling; probation; foster care; education and vocational
training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care shall
be available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.
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child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms
of others, and which takes into account the child's age and the
desirability of promoting the reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society."1 6 States Parties are to provide
children in institutions with education and vocational training,17
recreation and physical training,1 8 and a right of "periodic review
of the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her placement."19
Also, the Convention obliges States Parties to take appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures
"to protect children from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, '20 and "to protect the child from all
forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including
sexual abuse. ' 2 1 Protective measures to be taken by States
include "effective procedures for the establishment of social
programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for
those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of
prevention and for identification, reporting, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment.., and, as
22
appropriate, for judicial involvement."
In addition to the Convention, at least four other international documents address the circumstances and conditions in
which children deprived of liberty must be held. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty to which
the United States is a party, provides that "the essential aim" of
prison shall be "reformation and social rehabilitation," and
directs States Parties to separate accused juvenile offenders from
adults, and to accord juvenile offenders treatment appropriate to
their age. 23 The disparate impact of juvenile transfer on minor16. Id. at art. 40(1).
17. Id. at art. 28 (1) (b) ("States Parties recognize the right of the child to
education .... [and] they shall... (b) Encourage the development of different
forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education,
[and] make them available and accessible to every child.").
18. Id. at art. 31(1) ("States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest

and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities.").
19. Id. at art. 25.
20. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 33.
21. Id. at art. 19(1). See also id. at art. 34 ("States Parties undertake to
protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.").
22. Id. at art. 19(2).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 10(2)(b), 10(3), 14(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter

ICCPR]; see also U.N. Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/45/112 (1990);

U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, U.N.
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ity youths also raises implications for the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
another treaty to
24
which the United States is a party.
Although the United States has endorsed the Convention, it
continues to employ a punitive approach to juvenile justice.25
Several reasons account for the United States' failure to take the
international standards seriously. 26 First, it is not uncommon for
countries that have ratified major children's rights treaties to also
ignore their obligations.2 7 Article Four provides an example of
the qualified nature of the obligations assumed by States Parties
to the Convention. By attaching the term "appropriate" to the
measures a State is to undertake, the drafters provided a convenient rationale for any State inclined to ignore or give pro forma
effect to its provisions. Like most human rights texts, the Convention is riddled with qualifying language and subjective terms
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/45/113 (1990); U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/40/33 (1985). These
rules are not widely known or applied in the United States. David P. Stewart,
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY
161, 184 n.182 (1998).
24. International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, apened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
25. The United States signed the Convention on February 16, 1995, but
remains one of only two countries in the world that has not ratified the Convention. Catherine Langevin-Falcon, Second Class Citizens?, 58(6) HUMANIST, Nov. 1,
199. Today, ratification looks even more unlikely than it did four years ago, in
part because of the trend at the federal level to treat juveniles as adults.
26. Despite federal activism in juvenile justice, forcing these standards on
the states, to the extent that they exceed constitutional requirements, would
raise serious federalism issues. David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 176-78 (1998); see also
Lawrence L. Stentzel, Federal-State Implications of the Convention in CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED

WITH UNITED STATES LAw 57-83 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard Davidson
eds., 1991).
27. GLOBALIZATION OF CHILD LAw: THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS
41 (Sharon Derrick & Paul Vlaardingerbroek eds., 1999) ("[The Convention]
seeks States Parties without regard to whether they will immediately honor its
substantive requirements."); Michael Freeman, Introduction, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 4 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996) ("In all the countries surveyed, there is divergence between the new international norms and
the law and practice of the countries ....
Too many states ratified the Convention.., without giving serious thought to their own laws and practices."); David
A. Bolton, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospects for International
Enforcement, 12(1) HUM. RTs. Q. 129 (1990) ("[A] sober assessment of the
human rights situation throughout the world would reveal the ritual failure of
states parties to comply with standards established in instruments such as the
Convention.").
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that can be interpreted and applied in whatever manner a State
Party chooses. Second, many nations nullify international treaties and agreements by narrowly interpreting their obligations
and rights.2 8
Third, the Gault2 9 and Kent30 decisions have more positively
affirmed procedural rights for juveniles in the United States,
while other nations place greater emphasis on the unique interests and capacities of juveniles."1 The Gault reforms arose precisely because of the tension between due process rights and the
primacy of the child's best interests in the juvenile justice system.
Fourth, juvenile crime is an area historically regulated by states.
And although Congress has the power to enact legislation to
implement the Convention, it has proven unwilling to use its
treaty power to infringe state sovereignty.3 2 Finally, reversing the
current trend toward punitive measures is difficult because law
and policy continue to be shaped by political crises resulting
from extreme but rare cases involving juveniles.3 3
28.

A.

GLENN MOWER,JR., THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:

25 (1997).
29. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a minor before ajuvenile
court accused of behavior that may result in confinement has the constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to be notified of charges,
represented by counsel, and protected against self-incrimination).
30. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966) (holding that an
alleged juvenile offender has the right to due process protection from judicial
transfer to criminal court without a hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, and without a statement of reasons).
31. Of course, the argument could be made that it is only by providing
adequate due process rights that successful reintegration can be achieved. See
Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM.
JUST & BEHAV. 93, 103 (1990) (noting that the primary rationale for increasingly punitive programs in the juvenile justice system is actually to increase the
successful "reintegration of violent delinquents into the community"). See also
TREVOR JONES ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND POLICING (1994); David J. Smith, Youth
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN

Crime and Conduct Disorders: Trends, Patternsand CausalExplanations, in PSYCHOSOCIAL DISORDERS IN YOUNG PEOPLE 389 (Michael Rutter & DavidJ. Smith eds.,
1995); David J. Smith, Case Constructionand the Goals of CriminalProcess, 37 BRIT.

319 (1997). See also Desmond Browne, The Criminal Justice System, in CHILDREN's RIGHTS IN SCOTLAND: SCOTS LAW ANALYZED IN LIGHT OF THE
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 227-40 (Alison Cleland &
Elaine Sutherland eds., 1996).
32. Kerri Ann Law, Hope for the Future: OvercomingJurisdictionalConcerns to
Achieve United States Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1851, 1870 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1999)
(showing the political tension between the small number ofjuvenile homicides
and the overwhelmingly trivial nature of most youth crime); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY- LAw AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (1997)

J. CRIMINOLOGY
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The trend in the U.S. toward a more punitive jurisprudence
of youth crime places the federal law and laws of most states in
direct conflict with many of the human rights concerns
expressed in the Convention.3 4 Legislatures across the nation
are currently debating a variety of laws and policies to "criminalize" delinquency, and this issue is revisited annually by Congress
in legislation designed to "get tough" on youth crime. This past
year, Congress has also passed legislation designed to criminalize
delinquency, and has provided funds to facilitate state efforts to
do the same.3 5 The primary focus of these laws is the removal of
adolescent offenders from the juvenile justice system to the criminal courts for sentencing. In addition, several states have
expanded the use of adult punishment for adolescent offenders,
including incarceration in state prisons. Since 1990, nearly every
state and the federal system have expanded the use of adult adjudication and punishment for adolescent offenders. 6
What happens to adolescents once placed in the criminal
justice system and the potential violations of human rights that
ensue is the focus of this essay. The pace of change, the severity
of the new laws, the potential for unintended negative outcomes,
and the empirical reality of adult punishment ofjuvenile offenders creates new urgency to these questions. Unfortunately, there
has been little analysis of the comparative effects of statutes and
administrative laws that relocate juvenile offenders to the adult
court, and there has been virtually no research on the efficacy,
(illustrating the consolidation of power and resources when legal institutions
distort the small number of egregious crimes).
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIGH COUNTRY LOCKUP: CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN COLORADO (1997); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN LOUISIANA (1995); Law, supra note 32, at 1854-57;
Lauren B. Kallins, The JuvenileDeath Penalty: Is the United States in Contraventionof
InternationalLaw?, 17 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77 (1993).
35. Both political parties introduced nearly identical legislation in the
106th Congress that would broaden the categories of juvenile offenses and
offenders eligible for transfer to the criminal court. In S. 254, 106th Cong.
§ 1302 (2000) "Certain Punishment and Graduated Sanctions for Youth
Offenders" calls for "graduated sanctions" that would require adult punishment
after three successive juvenile crimes. This is akin to a "three strikes" law where
transfer occurs after ajuvenile reaches a threshold of prior offenses and offense
severity. The bill provides fiscal incentives to the states, via block grants, to
implement these provisions. Similar to S. 10 in the 105th Congress, S. 254
would also eliminate many of the current protections for separating minors
from adults in jails and prisons housing adult inmates.
36. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS (1999); Franklin E. Zimring,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998); THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
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impact and consequences of sentencing juveniles as adults.
There also has not been a careful examination of the costs and
benefits of "get tough" policies, in particular the mechanisms
underlying the unintended consequences of "getting tough" on
adolescents. Finally, there have been no efforts to reconcile the
theoretical dimensions of the legal threshold of adolescence with
theory and research on adolescent development and the natural
history of adolescent criminality.
These issues are the focus of the four sections of this article.
The first part discusses the tension between competing theoretical dimensions of the jurisprudence of adolescent crime in the
context of the current mobilization to shift the threshold of criminal liability downward in age. Although waiver of juveniles to
criminal court may signal the "end of childhood" for that
offender,3 7 theory and research on adolescent development suggest that the developmental process is far from complete with
respect not only to antisocial behavior, but more generalized
transitions from adolescence to adult social roles and behaviors.
In the second section, I assess the returns to crime control and to
retributive justice in current efforts to increase punishment for
adolescent offenders and to reduce crime. I review research
comparing the punishment and recidivism rates of adolescent
offenders adjudicated in juvenile versus adult court, research
that includes studies with a variety of sampling and measurement
conditions. The results suggest that the policy goal of increasing
punishment for adolescent offenders through transfer to the
adult courts has generally been achieved. However, utilitarian
goals for reducing juvenile crime rates have not been achieved.
Evidence has accumulated that increasing the certainty and
severity of punishment for adolescents may in fact increase crime
rates and heighten the same public safety risks that the legislation is intended to reduce. In the third section, these empirical
results are contextualized in theories of adolescent development
and criminology to locate the tension of iatrogenic effects with
prevailing policies of retribution and deterrence. The fourth section discusses the implications of this theoretical tension for the
jurisprudence of adolescent criminality, and for legal and social
policy of the American trend to punish juvenile offenders as
adults that will shape the theory and future of the juvenile court.
This conclusion revisits the human rights dimensions

37. John Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 179 (J.C. Hall et al.
eds., 1981).
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LEGAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL THRESHOLDS OF ADOLESCENCE

A.

Theorizing Transfer Law and Jurisprudence

The new waiver laws were designed to expand the number
and kind of cases where transfer occurs, but this expansive objective was pursued using a wide variety of tactics. The various
designs of the transfer "safety valve" will have very different
impacts on both juvenile and criminal justice systems.3 8 For
example, should transfer standards be designed to facilitate a
small number of cases-twenty to one hundred in a state system
per year-or to produce two to three thousand? Both types of
systems have been constructed. Should decisions be made principally on the juvenile's current charge or his prior record?
Should general standards for transfer be made be made in legislation or should discretion be delegated to judges or prosecutors
to decide? If discretion becomes the key to transfer decisions,
who should be trusted with the power to decide? And on what
basis? These are questions with constitutional, theoretical, and
practical implications. They address issues as profound as the
separation of powers on the one hand and theories of adolescent
development on the other.
The principles that govern transfer out ofjuvenile court are
one defining element of a theory ofjuvenile justice. One cannot
know why juvenile court is the appropriate place for the hundreds of thousands of accused delinquents that the court sees
without knowing what sorts of otherwise eligible cases are transferred out of the court's jurisdiction and why.
1.

Theories of Adolescence and Theories of Juvenile Justice

Are the youngsters transferred to criminal courts no longer
children in the eyes of the law as a result of that decision? 9 If so,
why? If not, how should the continuity of childhood status be
acknowledged in the criminal court? And should childhood status be decided on theoretical bases separate from culpability for
criminal behavior? These turn out to be important questions
about the boundaries of American adolescence. Ajuvenile court
for the adjudication of delinquency has become a standard feature of the legal construction of the first half of adolescence all
over the developed world. The exceptions to that practice
should not only help us to discern the prevailing theories ofjuve38.

Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, Editors' Introduction, in THE

CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).

39.

See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 37, at 179.
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nile justice but also theories of adolescence that form its larger
context.
Humans are unique among primates in the extent of their
dependence on an extended period of socialization and learning
in order to acquire the competencies and capacities of adulthood.4 ° The law has always provided special protections, or
exemptions from punishment liability, for young persons who
have not achieved those plateaus of adulthood.4 1 After a period
of flux, the common law settled on the chronological age of
twenty-one to define the status ofjuvenile, without regard to individual characteristics such as physical maturity, education, experience, or developmental competencies for reasoning or
comprehension. 42 The criminal law generally regarded a lower
age of fourteen as the chronological threshold at which offenders were responsible for their actions.4"
Although states have legislated lower ages in recent years,
the anomaly remains that a youth of fifteen cannot enter into a
contract but is liable for punishment as an adult for violating the
criminal law. The rule of different statutes for different contexts
remains the norm. Being of legal age for responsibilities such as
criminal punishment does not necessarily guarantee privileges or
rights such as drinking, marriage, or operating a motor vehicle.4 4
Some of these anomalies, such as permitting driving before age
18 but restricting drinking until age twenty-one, express the
intent to grant privileges to young people while retaining
residual control over their abuse of privileges that may endanger
the larger populace.4"

40. D. Richards, The Individual, the Family and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1980).
41. Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995); Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso,
The Evolution ofAdolescence: A Developmental Perspective on JuvenileJustice Reform, 88
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997). Under the common law, the age of
majority was the age at which men were thought strong enough to bear heavy
medieval armor. See B. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations about Abandoning Youth to their "Rights,"1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.605,
613 (1976).
42.

MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAw

4 (1997).

43. Frank Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibilityfor Young Offenders, 29 NEB. L.
REv. 521, 527-28 (1950).
44. ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD FAMILY AND THE STATE
967 (3d ed. 1995).
45.

26 (1982).

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE
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Amenability as a Socially Constructed Narrative

These new laws distort the one theoretical construct that historically served as the marker of the boundary: "amenability to
treatment." Historically, the sole basis for juvenile court intervention was to correct the development of a child found delinquent, and the mechanism for delivering that help was to require
treatment of youths and their families either in the community
or in special institutions. Judge Julian Mack's classic statement of
the original theory of the juvenile court suggested that the function of the court was: "not so much to punish as to reform, not to
degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make
[the delinquent] an offender but a worthy citizen."4 6
Amenability was always the language through which waiver
decisions were rationalized and justified, but it also was the language that justified a separate juvenile court. Amenability to
treatment was one of the bases for removing cases to the criminal
court; blameworthiness was not. But in its origins, the juvenile
court failed to develop conceptual meaning, operational criteria,
decision standards, or procedures for consistent application of
amenability. Thus, there is no positive definition of amenability;
we only know who is not amenable. Accordingly, we rarely know
the real reasons why decisions to transfer are made. It assembles
under the umbrella category of non-amenability, a miscellaneous
collection of situations. Thus, the term amenable has lost any distinctive conceptual meaning. The label will be applied whenever
the result must be achieved.
Moreover, these ideas change over time. Since amenability
is simply the language usual to describe the exclusions, the content and interpretation of amenability have changed over time to
reflect prevailing norms about crime, children, and the juvenile
court itself. Waiver was the escape hatch for expulsion of adolescents who did not fit the contemporary vision of the juvenile
court.4 7

B.

The Legal Border

The past decade has seen every state adopt one or more statutory strategies to increase the number of adolescent offenders
whose cases are relocated to the criminal court. 48 Some states

have simplified procedures for judicial waiver, others have
46.
47.

Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
David Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in

THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
48. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998).
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expanded the number of cases eligible for judicial waiver, and
still others have reassigned the burden of proof for denying
waiver from the prosecution to the defense counsel.4 9 In some
states, legislatures have excluded specific offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction. Others permit prosecutorial choice of forum
between concurrentjurisdictions. Such shifts in the allocation of
decision-making authority also reflect contemporary notions
regarding the tensions between the judiciary and the prosecutorial function.5 °
While retaining the traditional boundaries ofjuvenile court
jurisdiction, other states have taken steps to make the conditions
of confinement harsher: mandatory minimum terms of secure
confinement, mandated confinement in secure settings, and
recently, confinement in adult institutions. Several states have
adopted "blended" sentencing schemes, allowing for the transfer
of adolescents to adult institutions when they reach age eighteen.
Choosing the criteria for "adulthood" reflects tensions in sentencing policies between retribution and rehabilitation as well as
questions about culpability (criminal liability), competence to
stand trial, and the risk of continued criminality versus behavioral change."
These developments reflect the presumption in law and policy that those who commit crimes that are remanded to the criminal court, or even those who are charged with such crimes, are
fully culpable for their acts. This legal threshold clashes with
both emerging empirical evidence on the immaturity of adolescents with respect to both their ability to make informed and
nuanced judgments about their behavior and their moral development.5 2 By ignoring these indicia of culpability, the new transfer or waiver policies offend the common law doctrine of
incapacity. The modem expression of the common law "infancy
defense" states that children lack capacity to form intent to com49. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987);
YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS (Donna M. Hamparian et al.
eds., 1982); P. GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS (1998); Robert 0. Dawson,Judicial
Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:
TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin

E. Zimring eds., 2000).
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diction: A History and Critique, in
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mit crimes below the age of fourteen.5 3 Recent research suggests
that this incapacity persists through much of adolescence, with
juvenile and adult capacities converging not until age 16 or
beyond.5 4 Capacity is a prerequisite of "intent," or mens rea, and
is the essential element of culpability:
[A] ens reais the state of mind required to commit a blameworthy act. The concept of legal responsibility, or the
capacity to have a culpable state of mind overlaps, in part,
with mens rea. Unless the accused has the capacity to be
culpable, it is impossible for him to maintain the specific
mental state, or mens rea, required for commission of a
criminal offense. Legal responsibility may be viewed as a
fundamental pre-requisite to the existence of mens rea.....
Legal responsibility focuses. . .on whether the accused's
deficiencies of judgment distinguish him from others in
society
such that we do not expect him to comply with the
55
law.
Accordingly, for children accused of crimes and considered
for prosecution as an adult, this determination requires a
broader inquiry than simply a mens rea analysis, and explicitly
points to developmental factors that surround the border
between juvenile and criminal court, and that may bear on the
ability to form criminal intent. Courts have typically focused on
factors such as the child's understanding of the consequences of
his act and his ability to act autonomously in determining
whether an "infancy defense" is appropriate.5 6 Recently, courts
also have considered adolescents' capacity for impulse control.5 7
Criminal law also assumes that offenders make rational, autonomous decisions to commit crimes, 8 and that culpability or
blameworthiness is reduced when adolescents are not rational,
autonomous decision makers. 59 The legal theory of modern
transfer policy-that children are blameworthy for specific
offenses at specific ages well below the legal age of majority-is
53. See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 424, 425 (3d ed. 2000).
54. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, infra note 148; Scott et al.,
supra note 41, at 136.
55. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 503, 537 (1984); Scott et al., supra note 41 at 136.
56. Walkover, supra note 55, at 512.
57. Id. at 559-60; Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, and Competency in
Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JusT. 27 (Summer 2000); Robert Sheperd,
Juvenile Justice: The Rebirth of the Infancy Defense, CRIMINAL JusT. 45 (Summer

2000).
58. Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 547, 590 (2000).

59.

Id. at 590.
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disputed by the fact of immaturity among adolescent offenders.
"The evidence from developmental psychology challenges the
account of adolescence offered by the modem punitive reformers who generally do not accept that relevant differences exist
between youthful and adult offenders."6' Adolescents' decisionmaking processes differ from adults,6" and their immaturity com-

promises their ability to weigh the costs and benefits of, and
potential consequences of, criminal acts.62
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,6" the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
that the law views adolescents as different intellectually and emotionally from adults. These differences translate into a jurisprudential and decisional paradigm about the selection of a judicial
forum, according primacy to their diminished experience, perspective, and judgment. Recent policies that have redrawn the
boundary between juvenile and adult court sharply depart from
both these jurisprudential foundations and also the weight of
modem scientific evidence.
C.

Punishment Perspectives

Theory and law may be less important in the current debate
on the boundary of juvenile justice than two separate but politically confounded concerns with punishment. The first involves
the problem of the implicit reduction in culpability for adolescents in the juvenile court, and the attendant discount for adolescents punished as juveniles. Serious crimes committed by young
offenders may reflect developmental deficiencies in autonomy
and social judgment, suggesting a reduction in their culpability
and, in turn, their punishment liability.' But the principle of
penal proportionality would require more severe punishment
60. Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 307 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000).
61.
Daniel Keating, Adolescent Thinking, in AT THE THRESHOLD 54-89
(Shirley Feldman et al. eds., 1990); Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents'Judgement and Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPEcrIVE ON JUVENILE JUsTICE 325, 333 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert Schwartz eds., 2000).

62. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, CriminalResponsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 102-03 (1997).
Three psychological factors impact adolescent decision making: responsibility,
comprehension of situational complexity, and ability to control impulsivity.
Scott et al., supra note 41, at 161.
63. 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
64. Scott et al., supra note 41, at 137.
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than that available in the juvenile court.6 5 There are some
crimes committed by adolescents for which the most stringent
juvenile court punishments require punitive responses beyond
the limitations of the juvenile court, punishments that fall far
short of the normative demand for punishment for such crimes
regardless of the age of the offender.6 6 Recent revisions of the
law are expressions of the primacy of penal proportionality over
reduced culpability of adolescent offenders. In this view, the
traditional preoccupation with rehabilitation in the juvenile
court, with its limitations on punishment liabilities, deprecates
the moral seriousness of crimes and offers inadequate
retribution.6 7
The second is the utilitarian concern with public safety.
Critics of the juvenile court question whether the juvenile court
can either rehabilitate chronic and violent young offenders at all,
or if it can do so while simultaneously protecting public safety.68
Citing rising juvenile crime rates beginning in the 1970s, they
contend that criminal court sanctions provide greater community protection and more effectively deter future crime.6 9 Ultimately, for those who view the debate from this perspective, the
controversy about jurisdiction for adolescent offenders is part of
the more general question about the relative efficacy of juvenile
versus criminal court interventions.
Supporters of the juvenile court argue that youth violence is
a transitory adolescent behavioral pattern that, for most adolescents, is unlikely to escalate into more serious or persistent
crime. 70 Given "room to reform," 7 1 adolescents can be punished
65.

Franklin E. Zimring, The Law's Construction of Children's Culpability, in

COMPETENCE, CULPABILITY, AND YOUTH: TOWARD A COHERENT SYSTEM OF JUVE-

NILE JUSTICE (Robert Schwartz & Thomas Grisso eds.) (forthcoming).

66.

Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in CHANGING BOR-

DERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT,

supra note 38, at 207.
67. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 36.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME 489 (James
Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1997).
70. See, e.g., DONNA M. HAMPARIAN, THE VIOLENT FEW (1978) (showing

that fewer than five percent of juvenile offenders are chronically violent, and
only a small fraction of them go on to adult criminal careers); ELIOTr CURRIE,

(1998) (showing that evidence of sustained
criminality by adolescents reflects the absence of effective interventions).
71. There is overwhelming evidence that most adolescents are unlikely to
sustain juvenile crime beyond their teenage years given opportunities for
change via natural maturation or through the benefits of effective intervention
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programs. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E.
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as juveniles without the "disfiguring" punishments of the adult
courts. That is, they argue that adolescent offenders can benefit
from the treatment services of the juvenile justice system. These
services reduce juvenile criminal behavior through developmental processes and therapeutic interventions, which pose minimal
threat to public safety and allow juveniles to avoid both the lasting stigma of a criminal conviction and the trauma of adult punishment. Although championing a rehabilitative regime whose
empirical foundations are suspect, proponents of juvenile court
intervention do not accept the criticisms of rehabilitative programs. They argue instead that weak evaluation research or poor
program quality
mask the natural strengths of juvenile
7
corrections.
II.

EMPIRICAL REALITIES OF CRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY

Lack of empirical information has not deterred legislators
from changing the boundaries of juvenile and adult court.
There is little information on the comparative advantages ofjuvenile versus criminal court jurisdiction on either increasing the
severity and likelihood of punishment, or on rates of recidivism.
Controlled studies comparing sentencing patterns in juvenile
and criminal court are rare. Studies comparing the crime control benefits of criminalizing delinquency are even rarer. The
available evidence provides a less than convincing case for either
penal proportionality in adult sentencing of juvenile offenders,
or in the utilitarian advantages of lower crime rates for adolescents whose cases are relocated to the adult court.
A.

Penal Proportionality

Whether the criminalization of youth crime has resulted in
more certain or severe sanctions is not at all clear. Martin
Roysher and Peter Edelman7" examined dispositions and placements under the New York Juvenile Offender Law,74 which reloJuvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionay Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 267 (1991); ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 48, at
69-87.
72. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 93 (1990); TED PALMER, A PROFILE OF CORRECrIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

73.

(1994).

Martin Roysher & Peter Edelman, TreatingJuveniles as Adults in New
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(John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981).
74. In 1978, New York State enacted legislation that gave original jurisdiction to the criminal court for specific felony offenses committed by youths
below sixteen years of age. This statute was known as the Juvenile Offender
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cated original jurisdiction to the Criminal Court for juveniles
charged with violent crimes. They found that sanctions were no
more severe in criminal court, and in many cases were actually
less harsh. While Roysher and Edelman followed samples of
offenders, Professor Simon Singer 75 used aggregate data on
counties across New York State to arrive at much the same conclusion. James Howell and colleagues (1995)76 similarly found
that youthful offenders (eighteen to twenty-five years of age) confined by the California Youth Authority for violent offenses were
actually incarcerated longer than juveniles or adults sentenced to
the (adult) Department of Corrections for the same crimes.
Comparing case outcomes in three different jurisdictions,
Peter Greenwood and his colleagues7 7 found no evidence of a
"leniency gap" for young offenders adjudicated and sentenced in7
criminal courts in three. Cary Rudman and his colleagues
found that sanctions in juvenile and criminal court for juveniles
charged with violent crimes in five urban court jurisdictions were
equally certain, but juveniles waived to criminal court received
harsher sanctions because there was no age limitation on sentence length for adult offenders. Professor Margaret Bortner79 ,
Law, and the offenders it covered were called "J.O.'s." See Simon I. Singer &
David McDowall, CriminalizingDelinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York
Juvenile Offender Law, 22 L. & Soc'y REV. 521 (1988); Merril Sobie, TheJuvenile
Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact in New York JuvenileJustice System, 26 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 677 (1981), and Simon I. Singer & Charles P. Ewing,JuvenileJustice
Reform in New York State: TheJuvenile Offender Law, 8 LAw & POL'Y 463 (1986).
Singer also found wide differences in the selection of jurisdiction for juvenile
offender cases, with judges often electing to use the "transfer back" provisions
to return J.O. cases to the juvenile (Family) court. Variation in the return rates
was attributable to bureaucratic variation, differences between courts in local
cultural norms regarding juvenile crime, geographic and structural variation
between counties, the criminal courts' working group structures as tightly or
loosely coupled systems, the severity of juvenile offender cases in the overall
stream of cases, discretionary decision making that assigns varying weights to
family and other social characteristics, and practical fiscal considerations. See
Simon I. Singer, THE CASE PROCESSING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN CRIMINAL
COURT AND LEGISLATIVE WAIVER IN NEW YORK STATE, FINAL REP. WASHINGTON,
D.C.: OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JusT. NCJ 148013 (1994).
75. See SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY (1996).
76. SOURCEBOOK ON SERIOUS, VIoLErr & CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS
(James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995).
77. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FAGTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS (1984).
78. Cary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DEUNQ. 75 (1986).
79. M.A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, OrganizationalRealities: Remand of
Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986).
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examining a broader offense range in the Maricopa County
(Phoenix), Arizona courts, found that juveniles do not receive
longer sentences from the criminal court than they would from
juvenile court. She found that juvenile court officials viewed the
waiver (remand) process as a legal mechanism for staving off criticisms of the entire juvenile justice system.
Some studies (e.g., Thomas and Bilchik, ° Houghtalin and
Mays" l ) found that juveniles are treated more severely when sentenced in criminal court than juvenile court. Not only do the
studies find that sanctions are harsher, but case attrition for
juveniles in criminal court is actually lower than for adults. However, like other studies, the samples ofjuveniles in criminal court
in these studies are selective and skewed toward more serious
offenses based on prosecutorial screening (for concurrent jurisdiction cases) and judicial waivers. These processes occur in British courts as well.82 There, Crown Court judges were reluctant to
impose more severe sanctions in remanded cases involving youth
ages fifteen to twenty-one convicted of "indictable" (i.e., felony)
offenses.
Results of controlled studies are inconsistent. For example,
Professors Donna M. Bishop, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, and Charles
Frazier compared sentencing patterns of 2,738 adolescents transferred to criminal court in Florida in 1987 with a matched sam83
ple

of

adolescents

retained

in

the

juvenile

court.

Approximately thirty percent of the transferred cases were sentenced to state prison, most for periods of one to five years, compared to 20% in the juvenile court. Moreover, average
incarceration terms of three months were far lower for adolescents in juvenile corrections placements compared to prison
sentences imposed on transferred cases by the criminal courts.8"
Research in the Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota juvenile court included all juveniles (n=330) from 1986 to
1992 against whom prosecutors filed during a reference (waiver)
80.

Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal

Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1991).
81. Marilyn Houghtalin & G. Larry Mays, CriminalDispositions of New Mexico Juveniles Transferred to Adult Court, 37 CRIME & DEtUNQ. 393 (1991).
82.

Home Office, Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, 1982, London:

Her Majesty's Stationary Office (1983).
83. D.M. Bishop et al., The Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court: Does it
Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DEUINQ. 171 (1996).
84. Dates of entry and release from juvenile corrections placements were
not available in the Florida study. Instead, the researchers assigned the average
time served across all juvenile corrections facilities. Id. at 178.
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motion. 5 More than two in three (n=215, 65%) were waived to
the adult court. Of those retained in the juvenile court, more
than half (54%) were sentenced to some type of long-term juvenile correctional facility, and an additional 20% to some type of
juvenile short-term local residential program. Most (82%) of the
waived youths were sentenced to a local (jail) or state (prison)
correctional institution. But the criminal courts also stayed the
incarceration terms of virtually all youths sentenced to local jails.
Among convicted youths, the incarcerations were still higher,
even after controlling for offense severity. The authors conclude: "[a] lthough the waiver process selects youths on the basis
of seriousness, the differences in the rates of dismissal, conviction and incarceration between the two systems are striking."8 6
Sentence lengths for incarceration in the Minnesota study
also were longer for youths sentenced in the criminal court, but
only for "presumptive" offenses.8 7 Adolescents waived and convicted on presumptive sentences received average incarceration
sentences of 966 days compared to 266 days for adolescents
retained in the juvenile court.8 8 For non-presumptive offenses,
adolescents in the juvenile court received longer sentences (182
days) compared to waived cases (134 days). Non-presumptive
cases were more likely to involve non-violent crimes.
A third controlled study compared matched samples of
(n=810) offenders charged with armed robbery or burglary
offenses, ages fifteen to sixteen, in adjacent counties in two states
where youths of similar ages and charges are sanctioned in differ85. Mary Rassmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,JudicialWaiver Policy and
Practice:Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQouALrly 73 (1995); Mary
Rassmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CaM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGy 449 (1996) [hereinafter
Podkapacz & Feld, End of the Line].
86. See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 85, at 487.
87. The 1980 amendments to the Minnesota juvenile code allowed prose-

cutors to establish a prima facie case, or rebuttable presumption, of
nonamenability and dangerousness by proving that a youth possessed various

combinations of present offense seriousness and prior offenses. See MINN.

STAT.

§ 260.125(3) (1992). The rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof to
the party opposing the prima facie case to avoid transfer. See Barry C. Feld,
Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
Rehabilitative Idea4 65 MINN. L. REv. 167, 209-10 (1981).

88. However, for adults, these averages included sentences in local jails
and state prisons. For offenders charged with presumptive offenses in criminal
courts, prison sentences were ordered in more than half (51%) of the cases,
with a median length of 1,459 days. Most non-presumptive cases in criminal
courts were sentenced to local jails, where the maximum possible sentence is
365 days. See Podkopacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 85, at 488.
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ent court jurisdictions.8 9 Cases selected from two counties in
southeastern New York were filed in the criminal court, and cases
from two counties in northeastern New Jersey were filed in the
juvenile court.9" Offenders charged with robbery were more
likely to be convicted in criminal court; there were no differences
for offenders charged with burglary. Among those convicted,
incarceration sentences were more likely in the criminal court
for both charge categories. Nearly half of the cases involving
robbery charges in the criminal court (46.4%) were sentenced to
prison or jail, compared to 18.3% in the juvenile court. A similar
trend was found for burglary cases: 46.5% received incarceration
sentences in the criminal court, compared to 23.8% in the juvenile court. However, sentence lengths for incarcerated offenders
did not differ significantly, either by charge or court
jurisdiction.9"
Recent efforts to criminalize delinquency have sought in
part to reduce the perceived punishment gap between juvenile
and criminal courts. At least for the most serious crimes committed by adolescents, imposing harsher punishments expresses normative views of the moral obligations of penal proportionality in
setting the punishment costs, and obviates any discount in punishment based on theories of diminished culpability or immatur89. Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court
Sanctions on Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAw & POL'V 77 (1996) [hereinafter
Comparative Impacts].
90. See id. at 85-86. The counties were matched on their rank order
within their respective states on demographic characteristics associated with
incarceration and crime rates. See also Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub,
Structural Variations in Juvenile Court Processing: Inequality, Social Control, and the
Underclass, 27 LAw & Soc'y REv. 285 (1993).
91. See Comparative Impacts, supra note 89, at n.9. Similar to the Florida
and Minnesota studies, precise incarceration terms were difficult measure. To
measure actual sentence length for incarceration sentences, the time served was
estimated as one-third of the term of commitment. This estimate was based on
aggregate data on length of stay in NewJersey Department of Corrections juvenile facilities for 1981-1983. It included commitments of up to thirty-six
months or age nineteen for state training school, and forty-five days for remand
to local juvenile detention centers for post-adjudication incarceration. In New
York, sentences to either Department of Corrections facilities or commitments
to Division for Youth facilities (as Youthful Offenders) were stated with minimum and maximum terms. The minimum sentence was used to calculate sentence length. This again was based on length of stay information provided by
the New York State Department of Corrections for inmates received in
1981-1983 who were less than nineteen years of age. Additionally, sentences
were standardized within the sample for both maximum time and time served,
providing a correction for inter-state differences in paroling and early release
practices.
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ity of adolescents.9 2 Three recent studies suggest that intentions
may exceed implementation when it comes to closing the punishment gap. Under three different sorting mechanisms for placing adolescent offenders in the criminal court, adolescents
convicted in the criminal court were more likely to be incarcerated, net of offense and offender variables, than youths adjudicated in the juvenile court. While incarceration is more likely for
youths tried as adults, the length of punishment is no different
on either side of the jurisdictional divide.
B.

Substantive Punishment

However, while incarceration terms may not differ meaningfully, substantive punishment of adolescents in adult corrections
may be far harsher than punishment as a juvenile. The distinctions between adult and juvenile corrections facilities are evident
in both overt and subtle ways. Although remedial programs may
be found in many prisons, adult correctional facilities emphasize
retribution and control. Correctional staff wear uniforms and
are referred to as "correctional officers." Adult prisons also carefully distinguish staff involved in remedial programs, such as education and counseling, from custodial staff.
In contrast, most juvenile corrections facilities integrate
remediation of social deficits and behavioral problems with custody and control.9 3 Juvenile corrections staff use the terminology
of remediation. Titles such as "social worker" or "counselor" are
used, unlike the "correctional officer" (or "CO") titles of guards
in adult prisons. Furthermore, uniforms are uncommon in juvenile institutions.
The difference between juvenile and adult institutions has
been characterized as a "treatment-custody dichotomy."9 4 However, efforts to close a leniency gap are more focused on the
length of punishment, not the conditions. But harsher conditions may often be an ancillary consequence of sentencing
juveniles as adults. A study by Martin Forst and colleagues is one
of the few studies of the "treatment-custody dichotomy" that
compares the experiences of adolescents incarcerated as
92. Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionalityfor the Young Offender: Note on
Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEvELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2000).

93.

See D. PARENT, OFFICE OF JUv. JUST. &

DELINQ. PREVENTION, CONDI-

TIONS OF CONFINEMENT 147 (1991).

94. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
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juveniles with a matched sample incarcerated as adults.9 5 In
interviews with fifty-nine youths in juvenile corrections facilities
and eighty-one adolescents in state prisons, the juvenile corrections sample more often reported staff as helpful in controlling
behavior and achieving personal goals. Using scales of four
dimensions of remediation climate,9 6 respondents in juvenile
facilities reported a significantly higher orientation toward
remediation compared to respondents in state prisons. 7
Placement of adolescents in adult corrections facilities also
exposes them to high levels of violence.9 8 Adolescents in adult
institutions have a relatively low and weak position in the social
hierarchy of prison, and physical vulnerability to attack accompanies their low status.99 In the Forst et al. study, the state prison
group reported higher rates of physical assaults by staff and
inmates: rates of sexual victimization were nearly five times
higher for youths in state prisons (8.6%) compared to youths in
training schools (1%)."°' These hidden dangers are unintended
consequences of legislative efforts to close the leniency gap.
C.

Returns to Crime Control

The utilitarian perspective on criminal sanctions for adolescents invokes the framework of deterrence. 01 Common sense
guides the deterrence doctrine: most individuals would rather
95. Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisonsand TrainingSchools: Perceptionsand
Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40Juv. & F M. CT. J. 1 (1989).
96. ALDEN D. MILLER & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND COMMUNITY

(1985); Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Forst, Risks, Fixers and Zeal: Treatment Innovation
and Implementationfor ViolentJuvenile Offenders, 76 PRISONJ. 5 (1996). The scales
measured perceptions of the extent to which youth-staff interactions supported:
(a) the development of social interactional skills (Social Networks), (b) promoted fairness and consistency in the application of rewards and sanctions for
behavior (Social Learning), (c) provided opportunities to develop social skills
and marketable job skills (Youth Opportunities), and (d) emphasized behavioral goals (Goal Orientation).
97. See Forst et al., supra note 95, at 9.
98. Paul W. Keve, The Quicksand Prison, 63 PRISON J. 47 (1983); JOHN
IRWIN, JAILS: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS (1985); Z. Eisikovits & M. Baizerman,
Doin' Time': Violent Youth in aJuvenileFacility and in an Adult Prison,6J. OFFENDER
COUNSELING, SERVICES & REHABILITATION 5 (1983); DANIEL LOCKWOOD, PRISON
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1980); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
99. Richard S. Jones & Thomas J. Schmid, DOING TIME: PRISON EXPERIENCE AND IDENTITY AMONG FIRST-TIME INMATES 78-79, 84-86 (2000).
100. See Forst, supra note 95, at 10 tbl.5.
101. For general reviews, see Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research On General Deterrence,20 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 545 (1986); Franklin E.
Zimring, & Gordon J. Hawkins, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL

(1973).
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avoid prison and accordingly are discouraged from criminal
behavior.1" 2 Yet, despite a growing body of literature on general
deterrence, there has been almost no research on the general or
specific deterrent effects of criminal court sanctions for adolescent offenders.
General deterrence is the threat or imposition of sanctions
on one person to demonstrate to the broader public the
expected costs of criminal acts. General deterrent effects
depend on the probability that offenders view their behaviors as
likely to be detected and punished. General deterrence also
depends on the perception by offenders that the punishments
will be severe (Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton and Matsueda 1986;
Nagin and Paternoster 1991). That is, the threat of punishment
will regulate perceptions of crime costs and the marginal gains
from crime opportunities. 0 3 Specific deterrent effects result
from experiences of punishment costs (pain or deprivation of
liberty), and offenders will choose not to pay that penalty or cost
again. 10 4 Professors Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, in
their seminal work on deterrence, point out that specific deterrence requires social actors to rationally calculate the costs and
benefits of crime, a notion that Akers has explicitly linked to
social learning processes. 10 5 Ultimately, the deterrent effects of
sanctions depend on their perceived certainty and severity. This
is commonly referred to as perceptual deterrence.10 6
Both general and specific deterrence frameworks also suggest that individuals will commit fewer crimes if they perceive
that the benefits of compliance outweigh the punishment costs
of legal sanctions. However, the salience of these societal benefits depend on the individual's access to material and social
rewards, as well as the premium the person associates with those
rewards. The availability of these rewards varies across communities, reflecting variation in local labor markets and other eco102. J.L. Miller & Andy B. Anderson, Updating the DeterrenceDoctrine, 77J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 418 (1986).
103. Samuel Kramer, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal
Deterrenceand the OptimalStructure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398
(1990).
104. See also George S. Bridges &James A. Stone, Effects of CriminalPunishment on Perceived Threat of Punishment: Toward an Understandingof Specific Deterrence, 23J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 207 (1986); see also Miller & Anderson, supra
note 102, at 438.
105. See Ronald A. Akers, Toward an Integration of Social Learning; Rational
Choice, and DeterrencePerspectives, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (1990).
106. See Williams & Hawkins, supranote 101; Daniel Nagin, CriminalDeterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 51, 57
(1998).
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nomic conditions. In other words, specific deterrence is likely to
depend on the individual actor's social context and prior experiences to calculate the opportunity costs of legal behavior, the
perceived costs, and likelihood of punishment, and the marginal
benefits of illegal monetary gains. Accordingly, legal punishments may interact with both an offender's human capital' 0 7 and
with the social context of his or her daily interactions, to produce
or inhibit deterrent effects.
There has been little systematic research comparing the
deterrent effects of juvenile and criminal court sanctions on
recidivism of adolescent offenders. Typically, these studies compare samples of youths transferred from juvenile to adultjurisdiction within a single jurisdiction, introducing sample selection
biases that confound comparisons of the two types of proceedings and sanctions. Others compare offenders from different
jurisdictions, introducing important contextual influences that
interact with the deterrent effects of punishment. 10 8 Only three
studies have systematically compared recidivism rates for adolescents sentenced as juveniles or adults, addressing the methodological problems in earlier studies.
In the Minnesota study, 58% of the transferred youths committed new offenses within two years of conviction, compared to
42% of the youths retained in the juvenile court, a statistically
significant difference.1 0 9 Offenses were more serious among the
waived sample: over 85% were convicted of felony offenses
against persons or property, compared to 63% of the waived sample. The frequency of new offenses was higher for the waived
sample as well. The analysis did not control for the sorting process used by prosecutors to refer juveniles for transfer to the
adult court. Accordingly, the transferred population had substantively different and more serious prior incarceration records
compared to the retained youths, in terms of both prior offenses
and failures in prior treatment efforts.1 0 Thus, prosecutorial
selection in this case may serve as a proxy for criminal propen107. Human capital includes educational attainment, job skills and experience, and other personal attributes that translate into making an individual a
valuable and desired commodity in a labor market.
108. John C. Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A
Review and Critique of Sentencing Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE
SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstien et al. eds., 1983); see also CHARLES R.
TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE
(1980); Charles R. Tittle, Evaluationg the Deterrent Effects of Criminal Sanctions, in
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION

381 (Malcolm Klein & Kathie

Teilmann eds., 1980).
109. See Podkapacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 85, at 490.
110. Id. at 491.
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sity, and the differences between the samples may reflect more
about that propensity than the differential effects of court jurisdiction. But two other possible explanations are offered for the
elevated recidivism rates of the criminal court population: socialization to criminal norms and learning criminal skills in adult correctional institutions, and therapeutic returns of juvenile
corrections interventions. This explanation is consistent with
other studies that illustrate differences in substantive punishment between juvenile and adult corrections.1 11
The Florida study shows a similar pattern of higher offending rates for youths transferred to the adult court.1 12 This study
used a case matching procedure to control for the selection and
sorting processes that allocate adolescents to the juvenile or
adult court. Cases were matched on seven criteria: (1) most serious offense for which the transfer was made, (2) the number of
counts included in the bill of information for the committing
offense, (3) the number of prior referrals to the juvenile court,
(4) the most serious prior offense, (5) age at the time of the
committing offense, (6) gender, and (7) race (coded
dichtomously as white or non-white). The matching process is
critical to the validity of statistical inferences of sample differences that exclude selection bias. 1 13 Matches were successful for
the first six variables, but transfers including matches for race
were less successful. Only two-thirds of the white transfers could
be matched to white nontransfers, and only about half of the
non-white transfers could be matched to non-white nontransfers.1 14 When the race criterion was relaxed, successful matches
were obtained in 92% of the cases.
Recidivism rates were far higher for transferred cases within
the first three years following conviction: 30% of the transferred
youths were rearrested, compared to 19% of the juvenile court
sample.1 15 But in a seven year follow-up, rearrest rates were comparable for the two groups: 42% of the transfers were rearrested,
compared to 43% of the juvenile court sample.1 16 The difference in long-term recidivism rates was not significant. However,
differences for specific offense types were evident. Recidivism
111.

Cf Forst, supra note 95.
112. See Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 182.
113. Jeffrey A. Fagan, NaturalExperiments, in MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 108 (Kimberly L. Kempf ed., 1990).
114. Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles To Criminal Court:
Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 548, 550
(1997) [hereinafter Winner et al., Reexamining Recidivism].
115. See Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 182.
116. See Winner et al., supra note 114, at 551.
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rates were higher for nontransferred felony property offenders;
there were no differences for cases involving felony violence. For
all other crime categories, rearrest rates were higher over the
longer follow-up period for transferred cases.1 17 Using multivariate analysis to control for the matching criteria, there was a
weak but statistically significant effect of transfer on rearrest:
after controlling for offense and offender characteristics, transferred cases were 1.59 times more likely to be rearrested over the
follow-up period. 1 8
Analyses of time to first rearrest showed that rearrest risks
were higher for transferred cases during the first 1,500 days of
the follow-up period, but the risks were no different thereafter. "' 9 Using survival analysis to characterize differences in the
time to rearrest, and controlling for offense types, transferred
cases were more likely to be rearrested over the follow-up period
for all offense types except property offenses. The authors conclude that, similar to the short-term follow-up, this longer-term
was more likely to aggravate
follow-up showed that "transfer
1 20
recidivism than to stem it.

The natural experiment comparing adolescents from New
York and New Jersey produced similar results.12 1 In this study,
recidivism rates were computed for adolescent felony offenders
adjudicated in juvenile court in New Jersey with matched cases
sentenced in the adult court in New York. For robbery offenders,
rearrest rates were higher for cases adjudicated in the criminal
courts (chi-square = 6.757, p < .009).122 However, rearrest rates
did not differ for burglary offenders by court jurisdiction. The
pattern for reincarceration was similar. Robbery cases in the
criminal court cohort were reincarcerated more often (56.2%)
than the juvenile court robbery cohort (40.9%) (chi-square =
16.56, p < .001).123 There were no significant differences in reincarceration rates for burglary offenders.
The annualized rate of rearrest offending was computed for
offenders with at least one rearrest (for a new criminal violation). 124 Differences between juvenile and criminal court cases
117.

Id. at 552.

118. Id. at 553.
119. Id. at 556.
120. Id. at 558.
121. See Fagan, supra note 31.
122. Id. at 92.
123. Id. at 93.
124. The re-offending rearrest rates were calculated by annualizing total
arrests over the time at risk during the follow-up period. Time reincarcerated
was excluded from the re-offending "window." Incarceration times for subse-
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mirrored the patterns observed for other crime indicators.
There were significant differences in rearrest rates for robbery
offenders in criminal court compared to robbery offenders in
juvenile court (2.85 rearrests per year at risk versus 1.67 rearrests
per year at risk) (F=11.24, p < .001). There were no significant
in the rates for burglary offenders by court
differences 1 25
jurisdiction.

Another comparison examined the number of days until
1 26
rearrest. This measure, called failure time or survival analysis,
showed that for robbery offenders in the criminal court, rearrests
occurred at an average of 457 days after first release to the street,
compared to 553 days for robbery offenders in the juvenile court
(F=4.662, p < .05). For burglary offenders, there was no significant difference between juvenile and criminal court cases. A Cox
regression model was used to assess the effects of court jurisdiction and sentence length on the hazard of rearrest within three
years of street time, controlling for the effects of case (offense
and offender) characteristics.' 27 The parameters showed that
the hazard of (or risk of) rearrest was 29% lower for adolescents
sentenced in the juvenile court compared to criminal court
cases, after controlling for sentence length.' 28 When specific
types of rearrest were considered, the same comparative advantage was observed for juvenile court sanctions for violent
offenses, for other felony offenses, and for misdemeanors. Only
for drug offenses did the model show a comparative advantage
quent convictions were determined using the same procedures for calculating
minimum sentences. Suspended sentences were not included in the calculation of subsequent incarceration times. Sentences to time served were estimated by computing the interval between the rearrest date and the sentencing
date for the rearrest event. Id. at nn.15-16.
125. See Fagan, supra note 31, at 93.
126. PETER SCHMIDT & ANNE DRYDEN WITTE, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM
USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1989).
127. Hazard models estimate the probability that an individual will fail
during a given time period. Hazard analyses simultaneously estimate the likelihood of two dimensions of recidivism: its prevalence during a given time
period, and the interval until rearrest occurs. The Cox procedure permits testing of specific hypotheses by including covariates in the model and testing for
their significance against a model with no predictors. See David R. Cox, Regression Models and Life Tables, 34J. OF THE ROYAL STAT. SoC'v 187 (1972); PAUL D.
ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR LONGITUDINAL DATA (1984);

WILLIAM R. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1990).
128. The percent reduction in hazard of rearrest is based on the
exponentiated coefficient [Exp (B)]. An Exp (B) is computed for each independent variable. It indicates the percentage change in the hazards of rearrest
associated with a unit change in that independent variable.
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for criminal court punishment. 129 Finally, tests of interactions of
sentence length by court jurisdiction yielded no significant
effects. 13 °
Thus, the comparative advantage of juvenile court sanctions
in controlling crime among adolescent felony offenders seems to
reflect its unique correctional context, and is independent of the

length of punishment. The substantive dimensions of punishment in adult correctional facilities offers an important clue to
explaining the increase in crime propensity among adolescents
that follows punishment as an adult and with adults. Increasing
the length of confinement offers no return to crime control for
this population. Moreover, punishment in the adult correctional
system seems to raise the risk of rearrest, an iatrogenic effect that
contradicts the predictions of deterrence theory. There is a consistent pattern of higher rates of criminal offending among adolescents punished as adults compared to adolescents punished as
juveniles."3 These results were obtained across a range of sampling and measurement conditions, and the effects were identified using different analytic methods. Whatever the symbolic
gains from sentencing adolescents as adults, these gains are discounted, if not reversed, by the increased public safety risks of
substantive punishment of juveniles as adults.

129.

See Fagan, supra note 31, at 96-98.

130.

Id. at 99.

131. Criminological research cites several noteworthy examples of
iatrogenic effects of criminal sanctions. Assailants in misdemeanor domestic
violence cases who are arrested are rearrested more often and more quickly
than a randomly assigned control group who were warned and released by
police. The effect was specific to offenders with "low stakes in conformity," as
measured by their employment (unemployed) and marital (unmarried,
cohabitating) status. See LAWRENCE SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(1992); Lawrence Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to Long-term Escalation:
Short Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821

(1991). Misdemeanor domestic violence assailants who received temporary
restraining orders were rearrested more often compared to a matched sample
who were given no such orders. See Adelle Harrell et al., Court Processing and
the Effects of Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence Victims, Grant 90-12LE-089 (State Justice Institute May 1993) (final report). Drug offenders receiving prison sentences were more likely to be rearrested and were rearrested
sooner, compared to a matched sample of drug offenders who received noncustodial sentences, controlling for characteristics of the offense and offender.
SeeJeffrey Fagan, Do CriminalSanctions DeterDrug Offenders?, in DRUGS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVES 188 (Doris MacKenzie &

Craig Uchida eds., 1994).
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Summary

Reviewing two decades of research on transfer, Professor
Donna Bishop condemns the "recent and substantial expansion
of transfer" as harmful and ineffective.' 3 2 Two decades of legislative activism have sharply increased the number ofjuveniles prosecuted as adults and sentenced to adult criminal punishments.
Many of them are below the age of 17, had no history of violence
that would pose a public safety threat, and were convicted of
nonviolent or misdemeanor crimes.1 33 The increase in transfer
has disproportionately affected minority youths, well in excess of
34
their contribution to the population of adolescent offenders.'
The weight of empirical evidence strongly suggests that there are
no general deterrent effects of increasing the scope of transfer
on the incidence generally of serious juvenile crime. 135 Nor are
there marginal specific deterrent effects on offending rates of
youths transferred to and sentenced in the adult court.136 In
fact, Bishop shows that in two studies, juveniles prosecuted as
adults had higher rates of rearrest for serious felony crimes such
as robbery and assault, were rearrested more quickly, and were
more often returned to incarceration. 1 3 7 The broad reach of
new transfer laws and policies captures both those whose crimes
and reoffending risks may merit harsher punishment, but also
many more who are neither chronic nor serious offenders, pose
little risk of future offending, and who seem to be damaged by
their exposure to the adult court. Whatever the gains of shortterm incapacitation, they are more than offset by the iatrogenic
and toxic effects of adult punishment for the larger group of
adolescent offenders.

III.

DEVELOPMENTAL INSIGHTS

In this section, we begin the search for explanations of the
elevated risks of adolescent crime following harsher punishment.
We apply our understanding of the contrasting incarceration
experiences of adolescents in these two punishment contexts to
theories of criminal behavior based on developmental psychology. We include dimensions of cognitive and emotional develop132. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult CriminalJusticeSystem,
27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 81, 85 (2000).
133. Id. at 85.
134. Idat 85.
135. Id. at 86. But see Steven Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J.
POL. ECONOMY 1156 (1998).
136. Bishop, supra 132 at 132-34.

137.

Id.
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ment. While others have applied developmental theory to
deconstruct punitive responses to adolescent antisocial behavior,"' theories of adolescent development are applied here to
explain the diverging developmental trajectories of adolescents
adjudicated and punished under starkly different conditions. We
find the explanation for the elevated risks of crime and incarceration following adult punishment in the tension between theories of adolescent development and theories of deterrence and
retribution.
Many developmental theorists locate antisocial behavior as
part of a normative developmental pattern that desists over time
as adolescents enter adult developmental stages.' 3 9 Mostjuvenile
offenders stop their patterns of offending, including most who
engage in violence during adolescence.14 ° The juvenile court
incorporated this perspective on adolescence as a changeable
developmental stage in the jurisprudence of the juvenile court,
where adolescent offenders were developmentally incomplete.
As noted earlier, Judge Julian Mack's classic statement of the
original theory of the juvenile court suggested that the function
of the court was ".

.

. not so much to punish as to reform, not to

degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make
[the delinquent] an offender but a worthy citizen."1 4 1
Thus, whereas the early juvenile court assumed that some
correction was needed to redirect adolescents away from criminality and into pro-social adult behaviors, modern developmental theory suggests that the cessation of delinquency itself is a
normative process, regardless of the actions taken by a juvenile
court or any other social institution.14 2 Prior research on correctional interventions for juvenile offenders confirms that rates of
138.
139.

See Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at 137.
See, e.g., Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescent-limited and Life Course Persistent
Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993); see
also Richard Jessor & Shirley Jessor, PROBLEM BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSOCIAL
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF YOUTH (1977); ROBERTJ. SAMPSON &
H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING (1993).
140. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
(1972); DONNA M. HAMPARtAN ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEW (1978); MARVIN E.
WOLFGANG ET AL., FROM BOY TO MAN, FROM DELINQUENCY TO CRIME (1985).
DEVELOPMENT:

JOHN

141. Mack, supra note 46, at 107.
142. Some disagreement exists over the precise age trajectories most
delinquents take toward desistance, the number of different trajectories, the
fraction of active delinquents that persist and for how long, or the social or
individual factors that explain differences in patterns of continuity or desistance. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 139; Daniel Nagin & Kenneth C. Land, Life
Course Trajectories of Different Types of Offenders, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1995);John
H. Laub & RobertJ. Sampson, UnderstandingDesistancefrom Crime,28 CRIME AND
JUST. 1 (2001).
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offending decline over time, and the marginal differences in reoffending rates across correctional contexts reflect differences in
the strength and integrity of the interventions. 4
However, there is less agreement on the mechanisms that
underlie reductions in the rate of offending during late adolescence, or its cessation by the time most adolescents reach early
adulthood. The assumption of adult social roles, with their
accompanying increase both in social control and stakes in conformity, provides one explanation for desistance. 4 4 Changes in
the daily routines of adult life decrease the influence of peers
while substituting the informal control of adult social networks. 145 Psychosocial development, including moral development, improvements in cognitive appraisals, and enhanced
reasoning and judgment, are intrapsychic factors that may promote desistance. 146 These factors include the development of
cognitive capacity and competencies including risk perception
and preference, social judgment, and temporal dimensions of
decision-making.' 4 7 Attainment of autonomy and independence
are benchmarks of adolescent development that reduce motivation for offending once adult social status is reached.1 4 1 Profes143.

TED PALMER, A PROFILE OF CORRECTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND NEW

DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH (1994); Mark Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A
Meta-analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION: A CASEBOOK, 83 (Thomas Cook ed., 1992), Don A. Andrews et al., Does
Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Metaanalysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990); Jeffrey Fagan, Treatment and Reintegration
of Violent Juvenile Offenders: Experimental Results, 7 JUST. Q. 233 (1990).
144. See Moffitt, supra note 139; Sampson & Laub, supra note 139.
145. Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth and Social Identity,
in YOUTH VIOLENCE 373 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998); Jeffrey
Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, The Social Contexts and Developmental Functions of
Adolescent Violence, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 71 (Beatrix Hamburg et
al. eds., 1998). Violence and other antisocial behaviors often serve a variety of
developmental functions associated with peer interactions during adolescence:
status and identity, grievance resolution, and avoidance of attacks. Peers are
the most critical audience with whom behaviors are learned, scripted, practiced,
and refined, while peers confer status and identity by serving as arbiters of
social behavior.
146.

ICHARD JESSOR ET AL.,

BEYOND ADOLESCENCE: PROBLEM BEHAVIOR

AND YOUNG ADULT DEVELOPMENT (1991); Moffitt, supra note 139; John D. Coie
& Kenneth A. Dodge, Aggression and Antisocial Behavior, 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD
PSYCHOL. (1997); Patrick Tolan & Nancy Guerra, What Works in Reducing Adolescent Violence? An Empirical Review of the Field (1994) (unpublished manuscript,
University of Colorado).
147. For a review, see Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at § II.
148. Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 145, at 71; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity ofJudgment in Adolescence: PsychosocialFactors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 253-56 (1996).
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sors Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso conclude that "the fact
that delinquent behavior desists for most adolescents as they
approach adulthood suggests that criminal conduct.., is associated with factors peculiar to adolescence."
What is it, then, about adult punishment that disrupts these
normative developmental processes and disrupts the natural
processes of desistance? Where precisely can we locate the conflict between deterrent and retributive theories on the one hand
and theories of adolescent development on the other?
A.

Developmental Deficits

Youths sentenced as adults are incarcerated during critical
developmental transitions from adolescence to adulthood. Adolescence is a time of stressful development, marked by changes in
both physical appearance and social status. It is a developmental
period characterized by physical stress, weak coping skills, tenuous identity and self-image, and high vulnerability to emotional
trauma. 149 It is a prolonged period, beginning with hormonal
changes and ending nearly a decade later with the transition to
adult social roles, often involving work outside the home.
Adolescence is marked by a series of social transitions,
including entry into junior high school and differentiated school
tasks, increasing use of the peer group as a critical reference
group for exploration of social roles, exploration of opposite-sex
relationships, and changing relations with parents and other
adults. Adult expectations of teenagers are changing just at the
same time that the adolescent's perceptions of himself or herself
are undergoing basic changes.
Additionally, this stage of development marks a time of pursuit of some universal goals of adolescence: social affiliation, mastery, social identity, and autonomy.15 ° The daily routines of
adolescent development occur primarily within the specific contexts of neighborhood, family, school, and peer group. Apart
from family, social interactions occur mainly among groups of
similarly situated children within schools or neighborhood peer
groups.
Incarceration as an adult skews the social networks and contexts where adolescents experience this phase of development.
Most adolescents pass this transitional period in mixed company.
Though their social interactions are dominated by peer networks, later adolescence is marked by increasingly frequent con149.

Beatrix A. Hamburg, Early Adolescence: A Specific and Stressful Stage of
AND ADAPrATION 101 (G. V. Coelho et al. eds., 1974).
Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 148.

the Life Cycle, in COPING
150.
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tacts with adults. Incarceration as a juvenile is usually of shorter
duration, and contact with a diverse population of adults is
restored upon release. During longer stays in adult prison, social
networks are proscribed and limited to prison inmates of the
same age or older, within institutional cliques, and occur for
longer periods of time.
The social organization of prison life is a culture organized
by older inmates and regulated through violence and exploitation."' The interaction of adolescent developmental status with
the rules of this context can reinforce violent behavior, both
within the institution and upon release. The social position of
adolescents in correctional institutions limits the ways that they
can gain social status and social identity that is critical to the
developmental period of late adolescence. 15 2 Social status inordinately depends on one's position within social hierarchies, and
for males those hierarchies are often established through manifestations of physical power or fighting. The continual demand
for personal "respect," coupled with limited avenues by which to
attain it, sets up conflicts that are often resolved through fighting, a convenient pathway to high status.
Other dimensions of social development may be skewed in
adult prison. The quality and availability of services for adolescents in adult institutions compares poorly with the conditions of
confinement in juvenile institutions.15 The accumulation of
developmental deficits during this time disadvantages youths
when they re-enter society regarding work, social ties, and marriage. These social roles, including worker, marital partner,
neighbor, and family member, are critical to the transition from
adolescence to pro-social adulthood. 15 4 These conventional
social roles serve two functions: they convey status, and they place
young adults in contexts of stronger social control that limits
their crime opportunities and reduces their motivation for criminality. 155 The poor quality of material services, including -education and vocational training, further limits adolescents' access to
these protective social roles.
The developmental contexts of adolescents in contrasting
correctional conditions are sufficiently different to produce
divergent trajectories of maturation, values, risk assessment and
151. See, e.g., MARK FLEISCHER, BEGGARS AND THIEVES (1995).
152. Jones & Schmid, supra note 99, at 84-86.
153. See Fagan, supra note 131.
154. SAMPSON & LAuB, supra note 139, at 160-62, 178.
155. Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 145, at 145-46 [article 1]; 79-80
[article 2]; Elijah Anderson, Code of the Streets, THE ATLmrIc MONTHLY (May,
1994), at 81-94.
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decision-making.1" 6 Accordingly, there are two potential developmental consequences of immersion in the disadvantaged context of adult punishment: attenuated development of normative
developmental skills and states, and skewed development of skills
and states that reflect the contingencies and norms of the adult
correctional context. These divergent developmental trajectories reflect the tension between developmental needs and the
consequences of retributive policies.
B.

Violent Socialization

Experiences of physical and sexual assault victimization during childhood and early adolescence raise concomitant risks of
aggressive and violent behavior in late adolescence and early
adulthood.1 5 7 This is true for both vicarious or indirect victimization"' (i.e., witnessing violence), as well as direct experience, or
victimization.' 5 9 Both acute and chronic exposure to violence in
childhood and adolescence leads to psychological, physical, and
social disruptions.' 60 Acute experiences result in a wider range
of reactions and symptoms, but chronic exposure during adolescence imposes particularly weighty developmental and psychological burdens, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
distortions in social information processing, and cognitive
156. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 148, at 268.
157. Scott Menard, Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Adolescent Victimization, YOUTH VIOLENCE RESEARCH BULLETIN, NCJ-191210. 14 (February 2002)
(ucing longitudinal survey data to demonstrate that victimization during adolescence increases the risks during adulthood of committing felony assault and
domestic violence, suffering future injuries, engaging in problem durg use,
manifesting psychiatric problems including post-traumatic stress disorder, and
experiencing marital and job instability. See also, e.g., ALBERT J. REISS, JR., &
JEFFREY A. ROTH, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVETNING VIOLENCE (1993).

158. James D. Garbarino et al.,

CHILDREN IN DANGER: COPING WITH THE

(1992) ;Joy Osofsky, The Effects of Exposure to Violence on Young Children, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 782 (1995).
159. Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence? A CriticalExamination of the Literature, 106 PSYCH. BULL. 106 (1989).
160. See, e.g., Michele R. Cooley-Quille et al., Emotional Impact of Children's
Exposure to Community Violence: A Preliminary Study, 34 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 10 (1995), 1362-68.; Fitzpatrick, Kevin M. and
Janet P. Boldizar, The Prevalence and Consequences of Exposure to Violence Among
African-American Youth, 32J. OF THE AM. AcAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 2, 424-30 (1993); Robert S. Pynoos et al., Life Threat and PosttraumaticStress
in School-Age Children, 12 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1057-63 (1987); Carl
C. Bell & EstherJ. Jenkins, Community Violence and Children on Chicago'sSouthside,
56 PSYCHIATRY. INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 1, 46-54 (1993); Dante
Cicchetti & Michael Lynch, Toward an Ecological/TransactionalModel of Community Violence and Child Maltreatment: Consequencesfor Children'sDevelopment, 56 PSYCHIATRY. INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 1, 96-118 (1993).
CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE
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appraisals of everyday social interactions, and depression and
other mental disorders.1 6 ' These experiences can influence
early adult socialization and adaptations of cognitive and affective states, leading to increased rates of violence as adults, as well
as both adverse internalizing and externalizing emotional
responses.
Various learning theories associated with aggression stress
the central role of cognition in the development of violence.
Aggressive behavior is maintained over time by cognitions that
include hostile attributional biases, aggressive scripts, and normative beliefs that validate aggression.162 The increased dosage of
violence exposure in adult incarceration, for example, proscribes
the number of scripts that are available for learning and adaptation, establishes a normative developmental context for the internalization of violent and antisocial scripts, and provides daily
affirmation for
the validity of hostile attributional bias in social
16 3
interactions.

Adolescents incarcerated as adults have greater risk of violence victimization, both directly and vicariously.1 "4 This exposure skews both affective (emotional) and cognitive (scripts)
dimensions of development. While juvenile institutions are
hardly safe havens for adolescents, there is a measurably greater
161. Garbarino et al., supra note 158. Kenneth E. Dodge & Nicki R.
Crick, Social Information ProcessingBases of Aggressive Behavior in Children, 16 PERSONALrTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 8 (1990).

162. Rowell J. Huesmann, An Information Processing Model for the Development of Aggression, 14 AGcGREsSIvE BEHAV. 13; Kenneth E. Dodge, New Wrinkles in
the Person-versus-SituationDebate, 4 PSYCHOL. INQUiRY 284 (1993).

163. See Fagan & Wilkinson, supra note 145, at 77-80. (Fagan and Wilkinson #2). Adolescents employ "scripts" as part of a strategy of "impression management" to gain status and dominance in potentially violent transactions. For
example, in street code, displays of toughness are directly related to reputation
building, offering a deterrent value necessary to avoid continual attacks from
other males seeking to build their own reputations. These are "scripts" of survival in milieus where violence is normative. Scripts are learned and reinforced
within specific social contexts, such as street scenes or, equally likely, prison
cliques. "Context" is a social setting that serves several purposes: providing a
stage where events play out for public consumption, creating expectations of
specific behaviors given specific situations, providing a regulatory structure for
behaviors (setting social costs and returns), and providing opportunities for
specific forms of interaction that may lend themselves to violence or peaceful
behavior. The latter might refer to physical spaces such as prisons, or social
spaces such as streetcorner groups. The development of scripts, the processes
of decision making, and the social definitions of conflict and other functions
served by violence, form in such specific social contexts. These contexts shape
normative definitions, imperatives or expected behaviors, costs and rewards of
violence.
164. See Forst et al., supra note 95, at 9.
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dosage of violence for juveniles incarcerated as adults. Longer
sentences for adolescents in adult courts result in chronic rather
than acute violence exposure. 16 5 And, exposure to violence
while incarcerated can compound antecedent violence exposure
experiences. Major life events, such as violence victimization as a
younger adolescent before incarceration, may be distal events in
current social and emotional functioning, but they may exert a
powerful proximal impact by aggravating current stress and vio66
lence exposure.
Moreover, the absence of social support mechanisms in
adult incarceration facilities increases the risk of maladaptive
reactions, including aggressive responses that mirror the violence
in everyday prison life. 167 Compared to adolescents in juvenile
programs and services, adolescents incarcerated as adults are
immersed in inmate cultures of violence, where violence provides tangible returns including status, protection, 'and material
goods or services." 6 Gangs are a controlling force in prison life,
and they trade material goods and human services, in an informal economy regulated by violence. 169 Affiliation often requires
a strategic choice based on both status and safety concerns.
Similar to socialization deficits, immersion of adolescents in
adult correctional settings may produce several developmental
deficits. One deficit results from the absence of social support
mechanisms to mediate the effects of chronic violence exposure.
Without both emotional support and contextual mediators, vio165. Chronic daily stresses produce a wide array of emotional and physical disorders in adolescents. See Bruce Compas et al., Coping with Stressful Events
in Older Children and Younger Adolescents, 56J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
405 (1988).
166. See ARNOLD LINSKY ET AL., STRESS, CULTURE AND AGGRESSION 169

(1995).
167. Id.; Nan Lin et al., The Buffering Effect of Social Support Subsequent to an
Important Life Event, 26J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 247. Socially generated stress is
an important organizing principle for children's exposure to violence primarily
because of its broad association with a wide array of adaptive behaviors and
mental and physical health disorders. When severe stress is experienced as a life
event, such as violence exposure, an individual is motivated to reduce the discrepancy between negatively perceived aspects of the environment and his or
her own personal requirements. This goal is achieved either by adapting to the
environment or exerting control over it. Whether control or adaptation occurs
depends on both the change potential of the physical or social environment
(which is quite low for an adolescent in prison), or the individual's own perceived control over environmental events (again, low for adolescents in prison).
168. JOHN IRWIN, THE FELON (1972); BARRY C. FELD, INMATE SUBCULTURES
AND DELINQUENCY (1977); MARK FLEISCHER, BEGGARS AND THIEVES (1995).
169. See HANS TOCH AND KENNETH ADAMS, COPING: MALADAPTATION IN

PRISONS (1989); Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in
Prisons, in PRISONS 205, 245-49 (Michael Tonry and Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
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lence exposure produces distortions in cognitive and emotional
development that may elevate later aggression. Narrow contexts
of choice of behaviors may produce a restricted range of choices
in other social contexts following prison release. A second deficit consists of the attenuation of identity formation, the conflation of violence with masculinity and social identity, and the
internalization of violence norms. 170 A third is the attenuation
of forms of internal behavioral regulation. Although weak regulation of anger and violence may have led to incarceration, these
antecedent conditions are internalized and unchecked during
prolonged periods of violence exposure and practice in the
absence of the influence of other models of control.
C. Economic Disenfranchisement
The link between unemployment and crime is mediated for
many adolescents by their involvement in the legal system during
early adolescence. 171 Several studies focus specifically on the
negative effects of incarceration of adolescents on future employment. 172 In general, the impact of a criminal conviction during
adolescence creates collateral disabilities that have severe and
compounding adverse effects on the employment and recidivism
outcomes of minority adolescents as they enter adulthood.1 71 In
addition to economic disenfranchisement, a felon is disqualified
from jury service, 174 the right to vote, 175 and the right to hold
elective office. 176 In an increasing number of states, 1 77 felons are
170.

Fagan & Wilkinson, supranote 145, at 150-52. (Fagan and Wilkinson

#1).
171. MERCER SuulivAN, GETTING PAID (1989); SAMPSON & LAUB, supra
note 139; Jeffrey Fagan & Richard Freeman, Crime and Work, 25 CRIME &
Jusr.225, 238-45 (1999).
172. Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Economic Status of Disadvantaged
Young Men, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 215-26 (George E.
Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992); John Hagan, The Social Embeddedness of
Crime and Unemployment, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1993).
173. See Freeman, supra note 172, at 201; George Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:Reflections on the Racial Use of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895,
1897 (1999).
174. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 203 (West 1999); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAw § 510 (McKinney 1999);
N.M. STAT. § 38-5-1; TEX. STAT. § 62-102.
175. See e.g., FLA. CONST. ART. VI, § 4; Ajuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-904
176. See e.g., FLA. CONST. ART. VI, § 4; MINN. CONST. ART. VII, §§ 1, 6 ; N.C.
CONST. ART. VI, § 8
177. MARC A. MAURER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 186-87 (1999). Maurer
reports data from a study by the Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch
that estimates that nearly one American in fifty is currently or permanently dis-
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disenfranchised for life.1 78 Disenfranchisement disproportionately and severely affects African American males, consistent with
their distorted presence in the incarceration population: of the
3.9 million American felons who are disenfranchised, nearly 1.4
were African American males, representing 13% of all black
males.17 9 Not only does disenfranchisement disproportionately
affect young African American males, it severely reduces their
ability to influence these policies.
The result of legal sanctions during adolescence, especially
jail or prison, seems to lead to a defacto exclusion from legal work
and heightened prospects for re-offending and re-incarceration.
Sampson and Laub claim that, "job stability is central in explaining adult desistance from crime."18 The effects of unemployment, whether direct or mediated through legal constraints, are
strongest for the African American youths and youths from bluecollar backgrounds.1 8
The attachment of a felony conviction record as an adult
creates compounding barriers to employment during early adult
years. The workplace stigma of a felony conviction record
appears to mortgage opportunities and prospects for stable
employment in adult life.182 This complicates reintegration of
offenders returning from program placements or institutional
commitments. Adolescents punished as juveniles can avoid
reporting a felony record, but adolescents with adult conviction
records face employment discrimination in seeking work that
compounds other developmental deficits regarding socialization
and behavioral development. Accordingly, adult punishment
attaches a disadvantage that is cumulative over time. Adolescents
punished as adults are likely to have limited access to stable
employment and lower wages following incarceration. Moreover, their exclusion from legal work in turn may lead to weak
social integration due to truncated contacts with adults in work
settings.

enfranchised as a result of a felony conviction. See also Michael A. Fletcher,
Voting Rightsfor Felons Win Support, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at Al.
178. MAUER, supra note 177, at 186-87.
179.

Id.

180. SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note 139, at 162.
181. Terence Thornberry & R.L. Christenson, Unemployment and Criminal
Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal Structures, 56 AM.Soc. REv. 609
(1984).

182. Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, supra note 171, at 227; SAMPsupra note 139, at 165-68.; Freeman, supra note 172, at 217, 226.

SON & LAUB,
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Summary

Life course consequences in other domains of adolescent
development are also adversely affected by incarceration of adolescents as adults.'
In addition to negative impacts on jobs,
incarceration as an adolescent leads to lower rates of successful
marriage and child rearing.18 4 However, none of the prior
research distinguished adult and juvenile correctional placements. These studies were concerned only with incarceration as
a juvenile and they did not control for the labeling and stigmatization effects of an adult conviction record.
Accordingly, there are potentially important consequences
of treating juveniles as adults that remain unknown, differences
that may weigh significantly on the evaluation of legislative activism to harden punishment for adolescents. Differences in the
conditions of confinement and the quality of correctional services between juvenile and adult correctional placements predict
greater disadvantage in the life course outcomes of adolescent
offenders who are processed in the criminal system. There may
be differences in the quality of services and programming, with
less attention to the development of human capital in preparation for adult roles. There may be differences in the "prisonization" of adolescents based on differential exposure to adult
inmate cultures. Or, there may be differences in the rates of victimization and exposure to violence, with adolescents in adult
confinement facing higher rates of physical and sexual assault,
increasing their risks of subsequent violent behavior. 8 5 Finally,
the cumulative or interactive effects of these factors may influence developmental outcomes and behaviors following
incarceration.
IV.

ALLOCATING HARM: PUNITivE NECESSITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

Sorting through the noisy debates on judicial forum for adolescent offenders, two messages are consistently louder than
others. First, legislators claim that adolescents who commit serious crimes are as culpable for their crimes as any adult. 186 In
other words, when a person reaches a certain threshold of crime
severity at a particular age, there is no culpability discount that
attaches to age. Of course, the variation from state to state sug183. For a summary, see Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Offenders in Criminal
Court and Adult Prison: Legal, Psychological and Behavioral Outcomes, Juv. & FAM.

CT.J. 1 (1999).
184.
185.
186.

See SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note 139.
See Forst et al., supra note 95, at 9.
See Scott & Grisso, supra note 41 at 148-49.
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gests that the basis for this claim is grounded in neither theory
nor research. The claim is challenged, moreover, by empirical
research on adolescent development, and its ill fit with common
law traditions of diminished culpability or "incapacity."
The second, corollary message is that these adolescents have
committed acts of sufficient harm that merit more severe punishment than adolescents who have committed less serious
crimes.'" 7 In this view, a doctrine of retributive justice justifies
expulsion from the juvenile court, and attaches liability for more
"disfiguring" forms of adult punishment. Accordingly, adolescents expelled from the juvenile court have either committed
more harmful acts that merit punishment beyond the capacity of
the juvenile justice system, or they are judged unlikely to desist
from these acts, requiring sanctions unavailable in the juvenile
justice system.
However, the lessons of three different studies involving
three different mechanisms for expulsion from the juvenile court
suggest that there are sharp costs to retributive justice that may
neutralize if not outweigh the retributive returns. Yes, tangible
punishments differ for adolescents in the juvenile and adult
courts, and yes, they are disfiguring. But the deterrent power of
harsher sanctions tends to decline the more often and more
heavily it is imposed.18 8 The reason, it appears, is the clash of
retributive principles with theories of adolescent development
and developmental criminology. And the overreach of new
transfer law and policy burdens the criminal courts with children
whose risks simply do not rise to a level that would merit such
harsher punishment. The fact that exposure to adult punishment is a form of toxic exposure confirms the danger of these
new mechanisms.
The shift in discretion from judges to legislatures and prosecutors also raises constitutional issues. Several state appellate
cases have upheld this transfer of discretion. But the concentration of discretion at the charging stage is problematic when the
187. Others suggest that while two youths may commit equally serious
crimes, one may be more changeable-that is, amenable to treatment-than is
the other. See Christopher Slogobin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CoNTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES
299 (1999). However, the application of amenability principles is asymetrical.
These principles may inform waiver decisions at lower thresholds of crime
severity, but are irrelevant at higher levels of crime severity. In the latter case,
the demands of penal proportionality and retributive justice trump any other
considerations. See ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 162.
188. See Daniel Nagin, supra note 106 (describing sanction saturation
effects that diminish the deterrent effects of criminal punishments when they
are widely and non-contingently applied).
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charging decision is conflated with the determination of court
jurisdiction, and its gravity is amplified when the consequences
of jurisdictional transfer are considered. This conflict of interest
also raises questions regarding the separation of powers and judicial independence."' 9
By eliminating discretion on transfer, or conflating discretion with other enforcement functions, the new transfer policies
cut surgically into juvenile court populations, relocating broad
heterogeneous categories of adolescent offenders to harsher and
disfiguring punishments in the adult courts. Recent studies suggest that the few worthy targets of these policies are well outnumbered by many others whose culpability and risk are inflated by
rhetorical excess on youth crime.

189.

See Feld, supra note 49.

